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 Surveillance by another Name: The Modern Slavery Act, Global Factory Workers, and 
Part-time Sex Work in Sri Lanka 
 During fieldwork over many years in the Katunayake Free Trade Zone (FTZ), I witnessed 
numerous social encounters in which neighbors, bazaar traders, shop keepers, and auto 
rickshaw drivers used variations of the term ‘whore’ to refer to FTZ workers.  The article 
‘City of Whores’ (Author 2008a) began with a vignette that described how workers were 
called ‘no-good whores’ merely for migrating to cities and living away from patriarchal 
control.  Such denigration was so prevalent that the workers considered it to be normal when 
living around the FTZ. My earlier work addressed how anxieties about nation, religion, 
gender, and neoliberal changes have resulted in mobile women, whose relatively free lives in 
urban areas are considered a threat to the patriarchal order, being condemned as the 
destroyers of ‘authentic’ Sinhala Buddhist culture (2008a; 2008b; 2016). While such local 
moral anxieties led to increased surveillance and forms of control on workers’ lives in and 
around the FTZ, women found creative ways to express themselves and engage with newly 
aroused neoliberal aspirations.   
                As the global movement against human trafficking was gaining traction, many 
western governments and organizations promised far-reaching steps to eradicate the problem. 
One outcome in this regard was the UK Government’s passage in 2015 of the Modern 
Slavery Act (MSA), which seeks to prevent and prosecute modern slavery (forced labor).  
Article 54 of the Act, dealing with Transparency in Supply Chains, requires due diligence 
from British companies to manage the risks of slavery and human trafficking within their 
global supply chains.  This article investigates how MSA has impacted FTZ workers.  
Specifically, how MSA, a response to global citizen activism against human trafficking, was 
perceived, interpreted and put into practice at the local level and how it impacts a particular 
gray space, global factory workers sometimes manipulate to engage in part time sex work.   
This article analyzes how women navigate neoliberal aspirations and precarious, 
underpaid labor within competing local discourses that assign different values to jobs and 
behavior; and how the MSA affects such social navigation.  Thus I theorize how gray 
spaces—such as the one part time sex workers who are also factory workers navigate—
contain the potential for subversive politics, agency, and empowerment, and how global legal 
narratives and legislation impinge on such fluid spaces and thereby reenact old colonial 
power circuits. The article contributes to an emerging literature that seeks to understand how 
global citizen activism and resulting policies and practices endanger complex, context 
specific socioeconomic and cultural arrangements.  Such scholarship should help 
policymakers design laws are sensitive to local cultural contexts, and that incorporate 
grassroots voices. 
FTZ Work, Sex Work and the MSA 
As in other global factories throughout the world, Katunayake FTZ factories too are 
characterized by target oriented, fast paced work conditions that seek to exploit women’s 
labor for the least possible remuneration (Ong 1997; Saxena 2014; Hewamanne 2016).  When 
the Katunayake FTZ was established in 1978, it was unmarried women from rural areas, 
where wage employment was more or less nonexistent, who flocked to take up assembly line 
work.  They found accommodation with local residents who provided unregulated, 
substandard rows of rooms.  In early years hordes of men gravitated to the area looking for 
romantic relationships with the nearly 200,000 FTZ women workers.  Missing families while 
enduring difficult work and living conditions, most women were enticed into romantic 
relationships with such men.  This sudden rise of young couples in public spaces aroused 
moral anxieties among neighbors, politicians and middle classes.  The sensationalized stories 
in the media of rampant pre-marital sex, which is taboo, date rape, unwanted pregnancies, 
abortions and suicide attempts resulted in FTZ workers being stigmatized as transgressive 
women who behave shamefully and undermine values, customs and social norms.  The area 
was soon branded a ‘city of whores’ and ‘love zone’ and led to neighbors and police routinely 
calling successive generations of FTZ workers ‘whores.’  
Moral narratives that chastise transgressing women are not new.  Mills (2018) asserts 
that the gendered moral narratives stemming from new patterns of production and 
reproduction in Asia reveal how local ideological support sustains neoliberal models of 
development and governance.  Invoking both Lynch (2007) and Hewamanne (2008), Mills 
further elaborates how narratives and images of female immorality connected with global 
production in Sri Lanka initiate varied moral and material demands that marginalized and 
gendered groups must carefully navigate daily.   As in many other postcolonial societies, the 
anti-colonial movement in Sri Lanka also resulted in rigid gender norms.  The nationalist 
discourses of the late 19th and early 20th centuries thus resulted in women being considered 
bearers of national tradition and spiritual authenticity.  The island’s rural women were 
especially held responsible for being the bearers of ‘authentic’ traditions (Brow 1999). 
Therefore, migration of such women to cities aroused anxieties contributing to a fluid and 
sliding scale of perceptions whereby FTZ workers were branded whores, victims of predatory 
men, or innocent women who resisted immoral influences.  The specific gendered moral tales 
associated with FTZ workers thus presented them with several positions, and space for 
moving among those positions.  Workers quickly learned to navigate this field in interesting 
ways (Author 2008b). 
Free from family and village surveillance regimes women soon started enjoying new 
leisure activities in urban spaces including public flirtatious communication in places like the 
bazaar and bus terminal and shaded areas along the railroad and alleyways.  And it is such 
public activities with male friends that arouse the most disdain among middle class people.  
When combined with the sensationalized media stories about the FTZ, it is easy to 
understand why the area gained notoriety as a hotbed of culturally specific sexual deviancy.   
 Sex work is criminalized in Sri Lanka under the Vagrant Ordinance, Brothels 
Ordinance and Houses of Detention Ordinance, all of which were introduced during British 
colonial rule (Sri Lanka Government 1980). However, people in general reluctantly accept 
sex work as an inevitable part of life stemming from economic need and men’s excessive 
desires.  This allows for ambiguities even as the state resolves the resultant conflict by 
incarcerating sex workers and subjecting them to moral rehabilitation programs (Miller 
2013). Among all communities, women do not really have to engage in sex work to be 
considered a slut or whore—often transgressing behavioral codes suffice to be labeled as 
such (Tambiah 2005; Author 2016).  When female morality is equated with normative sexual 
behavior, suspicion of transgression can have costly repercussions.   
Within this context, the global workers who are called whores—just because they are 
mobile—find a fluid, ambiguous space in which they can strategically move among identity 
labels.  Engaging in part time sex work at night, for instance, provides additional income 
even as day time factory work allows access to a more respectable label. The field itself is 
fluid, in that a worker who engaged in factory work may temporarily resort to part time sex 
work to finance a family or health emergency.  Once the financial need was satisfied, she 
may return exclusively to factory work.  This pattern could be repeated whenever necessary, 
thus ensuring that the more respectable factory worker label can be utilized to save face. 
 Since around 2014 there is deeper casualization of factory work especially connected 
to Katunayake FTZ.  At the same time as increasing work flexibility, casualization of factory 
work exploits part time workers and undermines the labor politics of full time workers 
(Dabindu 2017). It is still only a small percentage that engages in part time factory work 
through manpower agencies (recruiting firms).  Temporary day labor is characterized by 
unpredictability, the absence of benefits, and forms of exploitation (Lane 2011). Engaging in 
part time day labor leads to workers engaging in several income generating activities to piece 
together a living.  One such activity, according to NGO activists and village agents, is part 
time sex work. While surveillance and vilification of sex workers and transgressing FTZ 
workers are not new (Lynch 2007; Hewamanne 2018), how the MSA affects the particular 
life ways and meanings that women created within this field has not yet being studied.  
Methods:  
I have been studying Sri Lanka’s global factories since 2000 and during the past 18 years 
have conducted ethnographic research on various topics ranging from identity formation, 
leisure time activities and CSR policies.  I first started interviewing part time sex workers in 
2012; before the MSA came into being.  MSA related interviews, focus groups and 
participant observations were carried out in 2016-2018.    
The article is based primarily on 14 in-depth interviews with part time sex workers, 
eight factory executives, six NGO officials, six area men, three police officers and two 
military officers. Two focus groups held in 2016 and 2017 were attended by 13 and 14 
workers (who were not sex workers) respectively.  All interviewed sex workers were Sinhala 
in ethnicity, while 11 were Buddhist and three Catholic in religion.  All interviews were 
conducted after spending time with the women and doing leisure time activities to build trust 
and friendships. My native language skills in Sinhala made this easier. Qualitative informed 
consent was obtained from all the interviewees and focus group participants.  Names of 
individuals and factories and NGOs are anonymized below to protect privacy.   
MSA Arrives on the Scene 
The MSA must be considered within the complicated political, economic and cultural 
context in which it is produced and practiced. MSA is the result of long-term lobbying by 
anti-trafficking organizations determined to eradicate all forms of forced labor. In fact, since 
2007 large UK companies have been required to report on employee, social and community 
issues in their supply chains (Barrientos 2013).  MSA’s predecessor, The California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2012, requires every retailer and manufacturer doing 
business in the state with annual worldwide gross business receipts exceeding $100 million to 
disclose efforts taken to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its supply chain 
(Pcfcorp 2017; Verite 2011). Yet such laws do not seem to have minimized forced labor in 
global production networks in any appreciable way (Barrientos 2013), which is perhaps why 
Verite reports (2010; 2011) have strongly recommended a global legal framework that holds 
all commercial actors jointly accountable for forced labor.    
Within this context, many heralded the MSA as a crucial piece of legislation that 
could eventually end the practice of forced labor.  It is Article 54 of the Act that led to such 
widespread optimism.  It stipulates that UK companies are responsible for any modern 
slavery associated with their supply chains, thereby forcing them to clean up subcontracting 
factories tied to their companies.  Article 54 requires companies with over 36 million GBP in 
turnover to prepare slavery and human trafficking statements for supply chains and publish 
them on their websites.  The statement is not merely geared to protect vulnerable workers 
from human rights violations. It is designed to also benefit business by protecting and 
enhancing the organization’s reputation and brand; protect and grow the customer base as 
more consumers seek businesses with high ethical standards; and improve investor 
confidence (UK Government 2015).  Indeed, businesses understand the dangers of their brand 
names being tarnished.  For instance, it took Nike 15 years and unprecedented levels of 
transparency to clear its brand name and “halt the protests that were denting sales” following 
sweatshop allegations (Financial Times 2017,10).  Nike ultimately benefitted by 
implementing good practices that cleaned up supply chains (Doorey 2011).  Although it is 
crucial to account for the human costs associated with profit maximization, the MSA 
recommended overarching steps to be applied universally.  It thus disregarded varied 
sociocultural contexts in which supply chains operate. It also failed to foresee how companies 
would summarily transfer the responsibility of maintaining a clean workforce to local 
suppliers.  The unintentional fallout in Sri Lanka has been the increased surveillance of 
female workers’ leisure time activities, which has led to a climate of suspicion, caution and 
fear that exacerbates their difficult work lives.   
Gray Spaces Matter 
Critical anti trafficking literature examines how human trafficking discourses, laws, and 
interventions often complicate ground level realities by neglecting to problematize issues of 
agency, consent, identity, and individual autonomy (Kempadoo and Davydova 2012; Marcus 
and Snajdr 2013; Molland 2013; Mahdavi 2016).  Galusca (2012) focuses on narratives and 
images deployed by the anti-human trafficking industry to show how they help in creating 
truth regimes on trafficked women across cultures.  Exploring the moral entrepreneurialism 
of the Brazilian anti-trafficking movement, Blanchette and da Silva (2013) highlight the 
unequal power relations between Brazil and Europe and sheds light on the paternalism of 
global activism. MSA in Sri Lanka reflect similar concerns even as its specific application 
within global production networks add new complicated nuances.  
 One such complication concerns the gray spaces that factory workers sometimes 
manipulate to engage in part time sex work.  According to Cathy Cohen, the radical potential 
of queer politics stems not from merely insisting on rigid, generalized categories of straight 
and queer but in recognizing the diverse forms of opposition to normative institutions (1997).  
Cohen’s insistence on refusing rigid categories and allowing for gray spaces, where 
subversive, oppositional acts against normative order ensue, informs my understanding of the 
part time sex worker/factory workers in Sri Lanka. Gray spaces afford agency to slip in and 
out of normative and non-normative positions.  In many cultural contexts, such as that of Sri 
Lanka, fully refusing certain identity categories is next to impossible, thus necessitating 
ambivalent spaces that allow for constant destabilization of identity categories.  For instance, 
FTZ workers get called whores merely for transgressing cultural norms; but this creates an 
ambiguous space wherein women can actually engage in sex work while utilizing the general 
stigma of FTZ work to project an “unfairly vilified,” FTZ worker.  The gray space—where 
FTZ workers are called whores and sex workers do part time factory work—facilitates the 
fluid movement between the two positions.  Manipulation of such gray spaces is not unique 
to Sri Lankan FTZ workers.  As neoliberal economic practices deepen precarity of 
livelihoods throughout the world, and many people find themselves working in the gig 
economy, engaging in several low paid jobs to make ends meet. They may or may not 
acknowledge some of the jobs they do.  Due to moral concerns, sex workers especially have 
to straddle various identities to manage reputations (Brenan 2004; Zheng 2009; Cabezas 
2009). What is unique about the Sri Lankan case is how this gray space over the course of 
time allows certain FTZ workers to achieve empowerment via land ownership.  
It is this vibrant space of identity work that the Modern Slavery Act now threatens. 
No one consulted the workers at the supply chain level when crafting the MSA, which now 
hampers a space that hitherto allowed some women a path to economic empowerment. Laws, 
policies and programs designed elsewhere that end up creating additional layers of control 
and regulation for those at the bottom most rung are not a new phenomenon (Karim 2011; 
Ruwanpura 2013; Vuolajärvi 2018). Wright (2004) showed how the attempts by political and 
corporate elite to make Ciudad Juarez, a modern and clean city resulted in the disappearance 
of sex workers and maquiladora workers from the city spaces. Ruwanpura (2013), 
demonstrated how the requirement of metal free working zones have created a new form of 
governmentality, in that the Sri Lankan workers now have the stressful responsibility of 
ensuring broken needles do not get into the garments they sew.  Similarly, the intense 
pressure on local managers to clean up their assembly lines, so that western companies would 
not be accused of modern slavery, is creating an unhealthy working environment where 
suspicion, surveillance and censure result in women’s spaces for subversive acts being 
curtailed.  According to Financial Times “action designed in the developed world to ease 
western consumer consciences” can have grave unintended local consequences (2017, 10).  
This clearly was the case in the Congo after Apple’s and other companies’ efforts to halt 
child labor associated with Cobalt mining led to thousands of legitimate adult jobs being lost 
and much socioeconomic upheaval (Edwards 2017). 
Although MSA had been designed to prevent UK companies profiting from forced 
labor, its spotlight has focused on sex work within supply chains.  This is not surprising given 
the not-so-subtle conflation of sex trafficking with sex work in much of the discourses 
surrounding the two issues (Weitzer 2009).  Policies that do not recognize the multi-
dimensional character of social contexts and human communities can end up hurting the 
people and communities such policies intend to protect (Hoang and Parrenas 2014; 
Kempadoo, Sanghera, and Pattanaik 2015; Mahdavi 2011; 2016).  For instance, Mahdavi 
(2016) notes that while anti-human trafficking networks have produced a multi-million dollar 
charity industry promoting initiatives to “rescue,” such policies are not just disconnected 
from migrants’ lived experiences but engender negative ramifications (176).    
By assuming that victimization by unscrupulous traffickers make third world factory 
workers enter sex work, local manifestations of Article 54 reproduce certain dichotomies that 
shaped colonial governance.  This understanding essentializes third world women as non-
agentive victims of oppressive men and disregards alternatives such as sexual and material 
desires that might lead a woman to actively choose sex work over other options.  More 
disturbingly, intentionally or not, Article 54 makes global factory managers (employers) 
responsible for workers’ leisure time activities and, by extension, their moral conduct.  Thus 
the surveillance mechanisms of both the UK government (via MSA), global corporations, and 
local cultural institutions converge on factory workers’ bodies.  Although MSA’s expressed 
purposes are to the contrary, it manifests within particular contexts and hence has the 
potential of becoming a part of discourses and practices that maintain and reproduce western 
moral superiority over the global south. In short, MSA manifests itself within third world 
factories as a global surveillance apparatus that has cascading effects of power at descending 
levels of global production hierarchies: UK companies requiring local managers to clean up 
their work force, and the latter in turn increasing surveillance of workers’ leisure time 
activities. 
Much has been written on how colonial thought, practices and processes that sought 
to legislatively control native bodies, life styles and institutions ended up disrupting 
colonized societies (Risseeuw 1989; De Alwis 1997; Mani 1998).  Such imperialist thought 
patterns, which essentialized the gendered, colonized bodies as oppressed, victimized and 
traditional, now influence the imagination and execution of transnational production and 
global assembly lines.  The assumptions underlining the structure of transnational 
production—that third world women were docile and non-combative and would therefore not 
fight for worker rights, or were obedient members of patriarchal households and secondary 
earners who supplemented the incomes of their fathers and husbands—have resulted in the 
low wages and poor working conditions at global assembly lines.  These assumptions 
stemming from prior stereotypes about gendered, colonized bodies have created an 
underpaid, global servant class that is catering to the cheap manufacturing and service needs 
of affluent countries (Parrenas 2001; Hewamanne 2016; Krishnamurthi 2018). MSA 
advances the neo-imperialist character by circuitously assuming the moral guardianship of 
this gendered servant class via Article 54.  This in some ways recalls Gayatri Spivak’s 
famous postulation “white men saving brown women from brown men” in the context of 
British colonial reforms in India (Spivak 1988).   
MSA attempts to legislate disparate geographical and national entities without regard 
to contextual politics. The results recall concentric circles of power (Abu Lughod 1990) in 
that while workers may become free of traffickers they get trapped within a broader circle of 
power involving local and global management.  In the Sri Lankan context, Article 54 adds a 
more powerful, official layer of control on women workers who are already enmeshed in a 
surveillance regime consisting of familial, community, institutional and state level agents and 
agencies.  Interestingly, this broader level may come in a particularly attractive package (i.e., 
ensuring one’s human rights), which leads to misrecognition and workers’ consenting to its 
controlling power.   
Rather than requiring UK companies to ensure a living wage and develop 
opportunities for education and economic empowerment, MSA criminalizes a gray area 
where the normative order is transgressed.  It is similar to how the U.S. criminalizes 
homelessness, in that legislators, rather than focusing on socioeconomic inequalities and 
health disparities, persecute homeless people for using public spaces for rest. By doing so, 
they avoid tackling complex issues like the need for providing sustainable work and housing 
opportunities (Boden and Messman 2015).  Studies on Sri Lanka’s ethical garment 
production narratives and practices show that the minimum wage stipulation has seen the 
least improvement (Ruwanpura 2012; Author 2017).  This is due to the simple reason that 
increasing the minimum wage also increases manufacturing costs, which then lowers profit 
margins.  Global assembly lines, after all, were initiated with the specific goal of minimizing 
manufacturing costs to the lowest degree possible.  From that standpoint, one cannot help but 
wonder if the singular focus on monitoring and cleaning up supply chains for trafficked labor 
is a way to deflect action on the all-important issue of providing meaningful living wages.  
In the following sections, I demonstrate how FTZ workers utilize the gray space and 
how the MSA impinges on this fluid space.    
Part-timing and Empowerment  
In the summer of 2012, I met Lilani, an atypical former global factory worker, who instead of 
going back to her village in North Central Province to get married stayed on in the same FTZ 
boarding house following six years of work. By then she had managed to buy a small plot of 
land in Gampaha, a town about 15 miles from the FTZ. Lilani now worked part time at a 
small subcontracting shop while making paper flowers as a side business.  Her friend, Taxila, 
had bought the plot of land adjacent to Lilani’s.   
In 2014, I contacted the owner of the workshop where they worked to so I could 
reconnect with Lilani.  That’s when in a hushed tone she said: “I fired her.  She is not a good 
woman.” After some prodding the owner divulged that Lilani and Taxila engaged in part time 
sex work and that was how they managed to save sufficient funds to buy land in Gampaha.  
The female workshop owner, herself deeply entangled in the gig economy, reviling the two 
women for using whatever avenues available to generate income was not surprising as that is 
considered the correct course of action by many Sri Lankans. Ilana Gershon (2018) showed 
that neoliberal principles are not rigidly prescriptive and that they can initiate different 
dynamics depending on the particular context.  Although neoliberal ethos celebrates the gig 
economy, Lilani experience highlights how it is only celebrated to the extent permissible 
within Sri Lanka's moral landscape.  Apparently getting their maneuverings within the gray 
space exposed entailed dire consequences, even before MSA.  But such exposure was rare in 
the past since no one pre-MSA had any official or urgent reason to investigate.   
 In an interview in 2016 an NGO official said while there are no definitive numbers of 
FTZ workers who are part time sex workers, it cannot be a large percentage of workers.  She, 
however, added that any number of workers could have engaged in part time sex work at any 
given time during their tenure at Katunayake.  In the following section, I discuss two FTZ 
workers’ narratives about part time sex work to highlight specific socioeconomic and cultural 
travails that lead to such work, how they navigate part timing, and the gray space of the 
‘whore’ label.  
Asha 
Asha hailed from Pollonaruwa District and worked at three well known FTZ factories during 
her time in Katunayake.  When I interviewed her, she was working as a “manpower” 
employee, which are temporary workers who typically gathered at the Katunayake 
roundabout to be hired by FTZ factories for day labor.  Asha liked day labor as it paid well 
and she did not have to work if she did not feel like it.  When she started doing part time sex 
work she was working as a full time FTZ worker.  “Circumstances made it impossible to go 
to work every day,” Asha laughingly said as a preamble to her story of moving from being a 
FTZ worker to part time sex worker.   
 She came to the FTZ at age 18 and was enthralled by the area’s offerings.  She soon 
experienced the stigma associated with the FTZ as those living in the area called her and 
other workers whores and sluts.  At first outraged, she quickly came to regard these 
encounters as a mundane fact of life in the FTZ.  Within one year she started a romantic 
relationship with a police officer.  Although Asha was reluctant at first, due to the taboos on 
pre martial sex, they quickly started sexual relations. She soon started to think of herself as 
his fiancé and believed he would marry her.  Unfortunately, Asha got pregnant in 2009 and 
the man thereafter stopped communicating with her.  Asha tried various ways to get rid of the 
pregnancy, such as eating raw pineapple and drinking vinegar.  No method worked, and she 
was contemplating suicide when an older worker in the boarding house, Shanthi, helped her 
get an abortion and thereafter financially helped her through the recovery period.  After two 
months of hiding in the boarding house, Asha and Shanthi, moved to a different boarding 
house and Asha got a new job at another factory.  Thereafter Shanthi, who was a part time 
factory worker/sex worker, introduced Asha to part time sex work.   
 “I first went with her to this pick-up point only because I was curious.  Then a man 
was very taken up with me and offered higher and higher prices the more I refused to go with 
him.  This amused all the other women (sex workers) and they encouraged me to go with 
him.  He was very good to me, bought me a nice dinner, took me to a very nice hotel and 
even bought me a pair of good ear rings.  We were together till 12:00 noon the next day and 
he gave me 2,500 rupees.”   Although workers can earn up to 25000 rupees a month through 
overtime work, the basic salary of a FTZ worker is 13000 rupees.  Thus Asha found the 
money from sex work to be ‘really good.’ Thus after a year of weekend sex work she quit the 
factory job and began doing part time factory work, which put her in a routine of three days 
factory work and three nights sex work.   
When I asked why she would not engage in full time sex work if the money was so 
good, she made a shocked face and said, “What will I then tell my parents?  What would they 
tell the village people? Whether I want it or not I have to keep working at the factories, so 
none of the other workers from my area can tell people there that I am not a factory worker.  
No, no, no.  That would be a disaster.  My whole family would be destroyed if the news get 
out that I am a sex worker.”  Her agitated response reminded me of a popular film titled 
Kinihiriya Mal (Flowers under the Anvil), that was produced 17 years ago. In this movie, a 
FTZ worker falls into sex work through a massage parlor.  When a village man sees her at the 
parlor and informs the villagers an angry mob attacks her family home, leading to the deaths 
of her father and brother.  The movie depicts how previously constructed notions of good 
womanly behavior elicit intensely antagonistic responses to sex work.  Thus I was not 
surprised when Asha laughingly noted that she would hang on to her factory job the way a 
downing man holds on to a branch.  This need to hold onto the factory worker label recalls 
how sex workers of Mexico’s state-run Zona Galactica brothel dress either in lab coats or 
styles common to other working females to escape stigma (Kelly 2008).   
 Asha further said she was not bothered by people calling FTZ workers whores 
anymore.  “All these innocent women who do not do sex work get called whores just because 
they are living alone and have boyfriends.  Here I am, getting paid, and paid well, for sex 
work,” She said.  Although she did not directly say so, she seemed to manipulate the 
ambiguity created by the haphazard use of the term “whore” to condemn factory workers for 
transgressing behavioral norms to her advantage. Asha noted that village people are not yet 
aware of part time sex work among FTZ workers.  She agreed that there were hardly any 
media reports of part time sex workers and, folding her hands, said “may it remain that way.”    
 She also said that she had boyfriends on and off during the years she engaged in sex 
work.  She did not tell them about sex work and none had any idea of her nightly activities.  
When they wanted to have sex she readily agreed but she had also found that she was now 
picky about sexual partners.  “If I am going to have to have quick sex with sweat-smelling, 
hairy men, then I want to get paid for it….” She said while laughing. She also said sex work 
made her pay more attention to her body weight, beauty regimens and stylistic clothes, and 
presented these new habits as positive developments. 
 In Asha’s case, we see a woman whose story is complex and multilayered, not just 
someone who engages in sex work for financial reasons.  Stigma of wage work—produced 
thanks to notions regarding ideal woman, and other unfair circumstances like FTZ workers 
being devalued as marriage partners—had led to her being abandoned while pregnant and 
eventual entry into sex work. She was not directly forced by an exploitative boyfriend into 
sex work. Rather, she seems to, at a very basic level, understand the value of work and sees 
sex work to be more dignified than unwanted and coerced sex within romantic relationships.   
Sashi 
Sashi hailed from Monaragala District and was determined to work hard, save, quit work in 
five years, and settle with a simple village man while building a house in the village.  
Although she did find a boyfriend soon after arriving at the FTZ, she managed to keep to her 
other aims resolutely.  Within five years she added two new rooms, a kitchen and a wrap-
around verandah to her parents’ house.  No sooner than she finished renovations, her parents, 
under duress from her brothers, sold the property and divided the gains among all five 
siblings equally.  This, together with her breaking up with her boyfriend, deeply depressed 
Sashi.  In this state of mind she accepted the first man who invited her to go to a rooming 
house and had sexual intercourse.  The fear of social repercussions further depressed her as 
she was brought up to believe that nobody would marry a woman who had lost her virginity 
before marriage.  During this time, she went out with another man who together with two 
friends gang raped her while forcing her to engage in ‘abnormal’ sex acts.  After a 12 hour 
ordeal she was dropped near a boarding house cluster, and a kindly boarding auntie (owner) 
took her in.  That night she met Shanthi (the same Shanthi who introduced Asha to sex work), 
who later introduced Sashi to sex work.   
Sashi went to Shanthi’s village and spent two months recuperating under the kind care 
of Shanthi’s parents and extended family.  “This healed most of the wounds in my heart 
[from the betrayal of family and boyfriends].  I came back to Shanthi akka’s boarding house 
and took up part time sex work, in the beginning just to pay back rent. But later to earn better 
money. I continued to do part time factory work so nobody could pin me down as a whore,” 
Sashi said. 
Sashi was outraged by neighbors and visitors to the area calling factory workers 
whores.  “I may have fallen into hard times and ended up a sex worker, but 90% of the 
workers are called whores for no reason other than having sex with their boyfriends.  In fact, 
even the men who have sex with workers then turn around and call them whores for having 
sex with them.  I just cannot even talk about it…So unfair, so unfair,” she tearfully declared.  
Interestingly, six FTZ area men I interviewed noted that they have more sympathy for sex 
workers because they felt it was economic hardship that drove women to be sex workers, 
whereas women who engaged in casual premarital sex with their boyfriends grossly violated 
cultural norms.  When asked about FTZ workers who engage in part time sex work, all six 
men—three auto rickshaw drivers, one factory worker and two shop assistants—used rough, 
abusive terms to talk about such women.  All of them noted that the few factory workers who 
engage in sex work give a bad name to all the good, hard working factory workers.    
When told of these interviews, Sashi said it is like “Damned if you do; damned if you 
don’t,” by pointing out how the men used the term whore to talk about workers having sex 
with boyfriends.  “How funny that they get called whores while working in factories, and we 
do part time factory work to not get called whores,” she later added. Although she did not 
elaborate, Sashi seems to allude to the slippery, gray area between the stigmatized FTZ 
factory work and part time sex work. “I go to (factory) work three days a week and that is all 
I need to maintain my reputation at my boarding house and the village,” she said.  When 
asked whether she engage in sex work for financial reasons, Sashi thought a long while 
before answering.  She said factory work could have been enough to make ends meet, but not 
enough to buy land or build houses and acknowledged that she will continue with sex work 
so she could buy land and build a house.  
Shashi has not had a boyfriend since the last disastrous relationship and does not want 
to get into relationships with men.  She sees sex work as a job that pays well and sometimes 
includes perks such as gifts and meals at fancy restaurants.  She said she does not enjoy the 
identity of sex worker but has orgasms often and likes the idea of living in a dream world for 
a moment when men praise her looks.  She has not experienced violence as a sex worker, 
although a few men repulsed her.  When asked about her long-term plan Sashi said, “all I 
want to do is to look after Shanthi akka when she is old, and run a home for children no one 
else wants.” Then she added with a quizzical smile, “yes, the two of us are going to run an 
orphanage from the house I will build with money from sex work.”  
Asha was more expressive than Sashi about how her clients were of a different social 
class than the working class pool of men they usually chose boyfriends.  She also noted how 
she liked sitting by the pool at a resort hotel in Negambo once while with a client.  She 
enjoyed the leisurely evening and said if that client asked her to become his girlfriend she 
would have immediately agreed just to return to that place again.  Both Asha and Sashi 
enjoyed going to restaurants they could otherwise not afford to dine in.  “Never knew such 
beautiful places existed in Sri Lanka, even the biryani at those places looked and tasted 
different from the ones in Katunayake shops,” Sashi said. They both said they would only 
accept clients who came in cars, as that to them indicated “wealthier, cleaner, kinder and 
gentler men.”  The two women clearly appreciate some aspects of urban, middle class social 
spaces that their pecuniary salaries deny them but sex work makes possible.  Both navigate 
the world of sex work to fulfill long term economic aspirations while using the factory work 
label as a protective shield.  
The notion of corporeal entrepreneurship (Wacquant 1995) is appropriate here to 
discuss how these women use sex work to seek long term social mobility.  All interviewed 
part time sex workers saw sex work as the only way to move out of the marginal positions 
that they found themselves in. Focusing on sex trade at the US-Mexican border, Susan 
Hoffman (2010) also shows how sex workers strategically use their bodily and erotic capital 
to counteract socioeconomic marginalization. Clearly, part time sex work is just as important 
for these workers as is managing reputations through part time factory work.  
Shanthi 
Unfortunately, Shanthi, who is the important link between Asha and Sashi and their entry into 
sex work, declined to be interviewed.  But from what one boarding auntie and several other 
workers told me, Shanthi is about 40 years of age, hails from Anuradhapura (in North Central 
Province) and worked at a FTZ factory for 15 years before starting to do part time sex work.  
According to rumors, she started sex work because successive boyfriends abandoned her and 
the last one left her with an unwanted pregnancy.  She gave birth to a baby boy and started 
sex work to help raise him.  A few years ago she boarded the child at a Buddhist temple and 
started factory work by day and sex work by night.  She is by all accounts a very kind and 
generous person who would help other workers in trouble by offering money, shelter and 
entry into sex work.   
According to Malsha, a worker who refused Shanthi’s offer of help, Shanthi thinks 
that sex work provides very good supplementary income.  Shanthi advised Malsha to take 
advantage of her good looks while they last and use the money to buy property, which no one 
could steal from her.  “She told me that factory work alone will never allow us to buy 
property, and if we do not have property, the moment we lose the job, we lose our strength,” 
Malsha said.  Shanthi did as she advised, having purchased a parcel of land near the 
Katunayake railroad in 2011, and building a small house with a concrete roof on top so she 
could add another floor later.   
Naila Kabeer (2011; 2016) has noted the importance of land ownership for 
meaningful women’s empowerment, in that owning land allows women to exercise voice and 
agency.  In Sri Lanka too, the land ownership affords women status and voice (ICES 2018).  
Shanthi in her own way seems to exercise agency by accumulating both cultural and 
economic capital. Despite rumors of being a sex worker, Shanthi seems to have earned the 
respect of boarding aunties and many workers as a hard-working, strong, no-nonsense woman 
with a heart of gold.  One such boarding owner told me that “Shanthi has solutions to 
everything.  How to fix a broken blender; how to get a copy of a birth certificate, where to get 
some sorcery done, where to get an abortion if needed…anything and everything.” 
By all accounts, Shanthi seems to be a strong woman who built a life out of very 
difficult beginnings.  However, it is hard to ignore the similarities to accounts of male pimps; 
specifically, the gentle grooming, seeking women in trouble and facilitating their entry into 
sex work, and the deep emotional bonds she creates with the sex workers.  For instance, Sashi 
said that she owes it to Shanthi to be successful in sex work and buy land, and that Shanthi is, 
“mother, sister, teacher, friend and everything else to me.” Both Asha and Sashi considered 
Shanthi to be closer to them than some of their biological kin.  However, creating kin 
relationships with close friends and mentors through address forms and emotional bonds, is 
common in Sri Lanka, and especially prevalent among FTZ workers.   
 
Shanthi appears to work alone and seems to have an organically developing approach 
to recruiting workers.  She also does not take a cut from the sex workers’ earnings.  
Furthermore, only four of the interviewed sex workers have or have had connections with 
Shanthi. All 14 entered sex work either through friend networks, or Shanthi.  Although some 
doubts remain about Shanthi’s role, it is important not to assume that all connections through 
which young women enter sex work as suspicious.   
Shanthi’s reported ideas about work, value and empowerment are intriguing.  She 
seems to understand neoliberal values rooted in aspirations and self-advancement well and 
helps younger workers achieve empowerment within their constricted choices.  Shanthi 
seems to fit the description; a former corporeal entrepreneur helping others realize the full 
potential of their bodily and erotic capital.    
MSA and Local interpretations  
As noted above, Article 54 of the MSA requires due diligence from British companies to 
manage the risks of slavery and human trafficking within their supply chains, prepare slavery 
and human trafficking statements for supply chains, and publish them on their websites (UK 
Government 2015). The failure to comply with the requirement can result in a law suit filed 
by the Secretary of State leading to unlimited fines (IBID, 6).  The government further 
expects organizations to improve their performance with regard to training due diligence 
within supply chains.  Organizations have taken steps to prepare their statements with varying 
levels of rigor.  Several companies, including Marks and Spencer, added whistle blower 
policies in addition to global sourcing principles, ethical trading auditing, risk assessment, 
and training of local staff.  Accordingly, the workers are expected to report concerns, using 
appropriate reporting channels, and management is expected to act upon these concerns. 
How does MSA adversely impact the gray space workers utilize for managing 
respectability? The adverse impact results from the intersection of the exploitative character 
of global production, dominant local cultural discourses, and a peculiar concoction of 
miscommunication between the center and the periphery—disjuncture between the needs and 
wishes of western executives, local management and workers as well as willful 
misinterpretation of original intentions in an effort to meet documentary requirements.   
British companies have a big presence in Sri Lanka’s FTZs.  In light of the new 
legislation, these companies have outsourced responsibility to local factory management to 
ensure supply chains are free of forced labor. The latter, consequently, feel tremendous 
pressure to monitor their labor force even beyond the shop floor.  Local factories depend on 
contracts from western companies and they therefore monitor not only the FTZ factory 
workforce but workers in their local subcontracting factories.  I interviewed four middle level 
factory human resources executives in summer 2017, and all of them insisted that the buyers 
(companies) require them to be diligent and eradicate forced labor from their factories.  This 
for them meant firing workers suspected of being forced to work against their will by 
boyfriends, or pimps.  When asked about the emphasis on sex workers, all said sex work is 
strongly linked to pimps and boyfriends exploiting women, making management wary about 
any sex workers also working in their factories.  When informed that some workers willingly 
engage in sex work to augment their income, a manager said, “the problem is that they would 
never admit to sex work, willing or forced. So, we have no other choice but to fire them if 
there are reports or rumors about women engaging in part time sex work.  If not, our factory 
can be black listed, and our orders cancelled.”  
All four executives interviewed in 2017 said that they heard about the MSA from their 
immediate supervisors, and thought the higher management may have been instructed when 
they went for meetings overseas or via memos from companies. In September 2018, I 
interviewed a Group Managing Director (GMA) and a HR manager in addition to two middle 
level executives.  They all understood that MSA is about eradicating forced and trafficked 
labor in their factories, and not about eradicating sex work elsewhere.  However, they all 
thought that if the sex workers are trafficked/forced, then having them work part time in their 
lines violated MSA stipulations.  Only two of the executives shared the names of companies, 
but with the condition that I do not publish them.  When asked to see the communication 
from companies regarding MSA, all executives declined, saying that it is prohibited to share 
information about buyers. This was in fact a rule preceding MSA, since even in 2000 any 
photos I took of the factory had to eliminate all signs of company names.      
The MSA stipulations have led to women being circuitously monitored even during 
their free time and leisure activities.  While surveillance regimes at global factories are not a 
new phenomenon (Ong 1987, Pun 2005; Author 2008b), the factory panopticon officially 
extending to workers’ leisure time and part time work is a deeper layer of control on women 
who are already supervised by many agents and institutions in their daily lives.  Although 
MSA has not initiated contractual or regulatory action to create a standard set of rules to 
ensure workers behave well outside the factory premises, the anxiety of being accused of 
aiding and abetting sexual slavery seems to have taken over at the managerial level.  For 
example, Gupte (2018) documented how manpower workers who were chosen/recruited to 
“go to the manager’s room” (to have sex with him) were asked by manpower and factory 
agents whether they are willing. “They ask ‘did you come by your own volition? or by 
force/coercion?’” one woman shared (15).” The contradictions inherent in this example aside, 
it evidences how tightly intertwined the local managers’ understanding of forced labor is with 
that of any kind of sexual labor. 
MSA and Factory Workers   
The challenges stemming from the new requirements have made matters more 
onerous for workers.  During a focus group conducted in 2016, four workers belonging to a 
large factory in the FTZ said the factory compliance officer (whose exact role none of the 
workers was able to describe) told them that engaging in other part time work, including sex 
work, posed the risk of being trafficked and abused and those doing so should stop such 
activities immediately.  They were also asked to inform management about factory workers 
who engaged in any kind of part time work.  The (corporate responsibility) compliance 
officer had emphasized several times that workers engaging in part time sex work or any 
activity that violated human rights could cause the factory to lose out on orders from UK 
companies, which could result in all workers losing their jobs.  Workers were also asked to 
leave the factory if they engaged in part time sex work.  As one worker noted, the meeting 
ended with the compliance officer emphasizing that the “security of our jobs is in our own 
hands; and that the workers alone are responsible for ensuring their continued employment.”   
Several other workers from four different factories said that their supervisors too had 
asked them to be vigilant and inform on women who may be engaged in part time sex work. 
One worker speculated that the sudden departure of an older worker (aged 28) who everyone 
thought was a little wild had something to do with this new policy.  While no one accused her 
of sex work, there were rumors about her engaging in casual sex with various boyfriends.  In 
a context where female sexual transgressions are equated with bad moral and ethical 
character (sluts/whores), this particular woman being fired due to pressure stemming from 
MSA is not hard to imagine.  Workers, however, seemed not outraged by the situation. 
Perhaps due to the prevalence of such speculation and rumors in factory and outside social 
lives, they seem to accept this official speculations, surveillance and punitive action as 
normal.  
Some have questioned the strength of MSA and asked whether it is enough to 
eradicate forced labor and human rights abuses (Guardian 2015).  No studies have yet 
questioned how MSA, designed and ratified in a western center, affect women workers in 
global assembly lines.  Considering the cultural context of Sri Lanka where, as in other post-
colonial societies, women’s purity is discursively constructed to be synonymous with the 
nation’s pride and honor, the misinterpreting and misapplying of MSA result in even more 
stressful work cultures shaped by moral surveillance, fear and anxieties.  As noted earlier, 
some women engage in sex work because factory pay is insufficient for achieving long 
lasting empowerment.  While the obvious remedy is to pay these women an adequate living 
wage—not just to make ends meet, but to live with dignity and achieve lasting 
empowerment—local factories appear to have embraced a policy of getting rid of the 
rumored/suspected part time sex workers in their effort to meet the UK requirement of clean 
supply chains.  The connection to the “race to the bottom” concept that characterize global 
production is evident here; because a meaningful living wage will lead to declining profits 
and hinder the “race to the bottom.” Although MSA intend to “create a race to the top by 
encouraging businesses to be transparent about what they are doing” (2015: 5), the outcomes 
at the ground level are still mediated through long entrenched ‘race to the bottom’ ideology.   
While factories within the FTZ follow the basic minimum wage stipulations, most 
subcontracting companies surrounding the FTZ walls do not do so. In the absence of 
enforcement, these locally owned subcontracting factories use part time workers and keep 
other workers at “trainee” positions longer to avoid paying the minimum basic salary.  Even 
well respected FTZ companies are increasingly relying on part time workers recruited 
through manpower agents. Although such workers are paid a stipulated daily salary they do 
not get any other benefits. While there are multiple and complex reasons for the increase in 
part time workers since around 2012, the MSA may also be contributing to the increasing 
demand for part time workers. This is, as noted earlier, not beneficial to the permanent work 
force and the possibility of collective action.     
Prior to the MSA being enacted, part time sex workers were able to use their 
connections to legitimate employment in global factories to move between stigmatized FTZ 
work and sex work.  While this space has not been completely eliminated, it is under threat 
now due to the MSA.  Unfortunately, a legislation designed to protect vulnerable workers 
from human rights abuses has added more controls, surveillance, and restrictions for Sri 
Lanka’s global workers.  The case of the MSA points to how legislation formulated in 
western centers can have unintended, and sometimes harmful, consequences at different 
nodal points of their global influence networks. 
Conclusion 
According to Scouler (2015), laws and policies work together with other discourses 
and practices to shape subjects, spaces and material conditions of sex work.  This article 
showcases how a UK law on forced labor interacts with local cultural norms and global 
structures of work to shape and reshape sex work, factory work and an ambivalent space that 
has hitherto allowed women to navigate varied work identities and ‘good women’ 
requirements. Much of the debate surrounding legalizing and decriminalizing sex work is 
now shaped by conflating sex trafficking with sex work (Weitzer 2007; 2009).  The MSA’s 
local manifestation showcases this conflation at both the policy and practical levels.  It thus 
ends up being another surveillance apparatus on factory workers even while presenting itself 
as a moral crusader for labor and human rights.  Meanwhile the complex and multivalent 
reasons why some FTZ workers engage in part time sex work face erasure due to the 
assumption that sex work is always exploitative and abusive.   
Thanks to the social constructions of corresponding dichotomies—i.e., full time/ part 
time; controlled/agentative; creative/boring; repetitive—South Asian workers’ bodies are 
already deemed less valuable than those of western workers (Elson and Parsons 1981). They 
are also constructed as passive, docile, submissive and victims of patriarchal forces (IBID). 
The MSA builds on and contributes to these constructed narratives.  Combined with local 
cultural notions of women’s good conduct, the MSA reproduces Sri Lankan global workers 
as victims (prone to trafficking and human rights abuses) while generating additional moral 
surveillance, leading to part time sex workers to be condemned as bad workers who could 
potentially cause all factory workers to lose their jobs.  
 In the Sri Lankan context, MSA has not only added another layer of surveillance but 
is creating a work place culture characterized by suspicion and fear.  This forces workers to 
choose between identity labels.  Moving among available labels is useful for gendered 
subjects navigating social spaces and opportunities that were formerly unavailable.  For part 
time sex workers at the intersection of global exploitation, national regulations, and moral 
anxieties, the need to hold onto the label of factory worker is deeply meaningful.  Factory 
work, taken abstractly is more respectful, but as noted above, the stigma associated with the 
FTZ leads to workers being labeled whores.  This creates the gray space women utilize to 
manage respectability. The MSA, has begun to impinge on this and endanger one of the few 
routes female global workers have for long term empowerment through land ownership.    
The Sri Lankan case evidences the futility of taking measures to prevent human rights 
abuses without considering the current exploitative global production networks.  Companies 
outsource manufacturing looking to exploit abundant third world gendered labor and 
minimize production costs.  From that standpoint, it is hardly surprising that the MSA, rather 
than requiring companies to change the ‘race to the bottom’ principle and providing workers 
a meaningful living wage, ends up requiring companies to provide comprehensive statements 
noting what they have done to eradicate forced labor within supply chains.  On the other 
hand, western governments, themselves steeped in neoliberal regimes, are unlikely to require 
companies to increase their production costs (i.e. worker salaries/benefits).  Thus, as always, 
third world women workers, in this case those who work in Sri Lanka’s global factories, end 
up being the ones who pay the price.   
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